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78-12-47

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 81.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 3; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 296.

78-12-47.

Key Numbers. 3(1), 131.

Limitation of Actions

"'°

Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in
malpractice actions.

In any action against a physician and surgeon, dentist, osteopathic physician, chiropractor, physical therapist, registered nurse, clinical laboratory
bioanalyst, clinical laboratory technologist, or a licensed hospital, person,
firm or corporation as the employer of any such person for professional negligence or for rendering professional services without consent, if the responsive
pleading of the defendant pleads that the action is barred by the statute of
limitations, and if either party so moves the court, the issue raised thereby
may be tried separately and before any other issues in the case are tried. If the
issue raised by the defense of the statute of limitations is finally determined
in favor of the plaintiff, the remaining issues shall then be tried.
This act shall not be construed to be retroactive.
History: C. 1953, 78-12-47, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 212, § 2.
Meaning of "this act". - The phrase "this
act," appearing in the second paragraph, refers

to Laws 1971, Chapter 212, which enacted this
section and amended § 78-12-28.
Cross-References. - Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, limitation section, § 78-14-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Summary judgment.
The statute of limitations issue in a medical
malpractice action may be disposed of by sum-

mary judgment ifno genuine issues of material
fact are raised. Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93
(Utah 1982).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions §§ 487, 488.
C.J.S. - 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 398.

Key Numbers. 176 et seq.

Limitation of Actions

"'°

CHAPTER 13
PLACE OF TRIAL
VENUE
Section
78-13-1.
78-13-2.
78-13-3.
78-13-4.
78-13-5.
78-13-6.

Actions respecting real property.
Actions to recover fines or penalties
- Against public officers.
Actions against a county.
Actions on written contracts.
Transitory actions - Residence of
corporations.
Arising without this state in favor
of resident.

Section
78-13-7.
78-13-8.

All other actions.
Change of venue - Conditions
precedent.
78-13-9. Grounds.
78-13-10. Court to which transfer is to be
made.
78-13-11. Duty of clerk - Fees and costs Effect on jurisdiction.
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78-13-1.

Actions respecting

78-13-1

real property.

Actions for the following causes must be tried in the county in which the
subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the power of
the court -to change the place of trial as provided in this code:
(1) For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein,
or for the determination in any form of such right or interest, and for
· injuries to real property.
(2) For the partition of real property.
(3) For the foreclosure of all liens and mortgages on real property.
Where the real property is situated partly in one county and partly m
another, the plaintiff may select either of the counties, and the county so
selected is the proper county for the trial of such action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-1.

Cross-References. - Defense of improper
venue, U.R.C.P. 12(b), (d).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Actions outside property's county.
Construction.
Specific actions.
Constitutionality.
Predecessor section was not inconsistent
with former Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5.
Sherman v. Droubay, 27 Utah 47, 74 P. 348
(1903); Snyder v. Pike, 30 Utah 102, 83 P. 692
(1905).
Actions outside property's county.
Default judgment in a trespass to real property action was not rendered invalid by the fact
that the trespass action was brought in a
county other than where the property was situated. Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 589
P.2d 767 (Utah 1978).
Construction.
The legislature intended to establish the
general right of persons sued to have the action
tried in the county where one of them resides
and to establish that actions which may be
tried elsewhere are limited and restricted to
those which the predecessor chapter itself excepted from the general rule. Buckle v. Ogden
Furn. & Carpet Co., 61 Utah 559, 216 P. 684
(1923).
Specific actions.
Action to foreclose mining claim is properly
brought in county where claim is situated.
Fields v. Daisy Gold Mining Co., 26 Utah 373,
73 P. 521 (1903).
Where note secured by mortgage is payable
in one county, and property is in another, fore-

closure is to be commenced in the latter
county. Sherman v. Droubay, 27 Utah 47, 74 P.
348 (1903).
Action to foreclose mortgage is properly
brought in county where the land is situated
upon which the foreclosure is sought. First
Nat'! Bank of Coalville v. Boley, 90 Utah 341,
61 P.2d 621 (1936); Boley v. District Court ex
rel. Morgan County, 90 Utah 347, 61 P.2d 624
(1936).
Action for rescission of contract for sale of
real property on grounds of fraud or mistake is·
not one in which gravamen of action is determination of right or interest in real property;
hence court did not err in refusing change of
venue to county in which real property was
located. Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 2
Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168, 46 A.L.R.2d 887
(1954).
A suit could be brought in a county to set
aside deeds by which plaintiff conveyed land to
the defendant, where one of the tracts of land
was situated in county where suit was begun,
although other tracts involved were located in
other counties; mere fact that intervener in
cause claimed title to property located in
county other than one in which suit brought
did not divest court of jurisdiction, nor of right
to try and determine title to property in such
county. Barber v. Anderson, 73 Utah 357, 274
P. 136 (1929).
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JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 10
et seq.
C.J.S. - 92 C.J.S. Venue § 26 et seq.

78-13-2.

A.L.R. - Venue of damage action for breach
of real estate sales contract, 8 A.L.R.3d 489.
Key Numbers. - Venue <l';a, 5.1 to 5.3.

Actions to recover fines or penalties public officers.

Against

Actions for the following causes shall be tried in the county where the
cause, or some part thereof, arose, subject to the like power of the court to
change the place of trial:
(1) For the recovery of a fine, penalty or forfeiture imposed by statute,
except that, when it is imposed for an offense committed on a lake, river
or other stream of water situated in two or more counties, the action may
be brought in any county, bordering on such lake, river or stream opposite
to the place where the offense was committed.
(2) Except as otherwise specifically provided, against a public officer,
or person especially appointed to execute his duties, for an act done by
him in virtue of his office, or against a person who by his command or in
his aid does anything touching the duties of such officer.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-2.
Cross-References. - Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq.

Limitation of actions against public officers,

§ 78-12-24.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
Predecessor section did not violate former

Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5. Snyder v. Pike,
30 Utah 102, 83 P. 692 (1905).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 92 C.J.S. Venue § 51 et seq.
Key Numbers. - Venue <l';a> 9, 11.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 63 Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 527; 77 Am. Jur. 2d
Venue § 24.

78-13-3.

Actions against a county.

An action against a county may be commenced and tried in such county,
unless such action is brought by a county, in which case it may be commenced
and tried in any county not a party thereto.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § I; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-3.
Cross-References. - Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq.

Limitation

§ 78-12-30.
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PLACE OF TRIAL-VENUE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
Predecessor section did not violate former

Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5. Snyder v. Pike,
30 Utah 102, 83 P. 692 (1905).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 20 C.J.S. Counties § 326.
215.
Key Numbers. - Counties

Am. Jur. 2d. - 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties and Other Political
Subdivisions §§ 855 to 857.

78-13-4.

Actions on written contracts.

When the defendant has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in a
particular county of the state and resides in another county, an action on such
contract obligation may be commenced and tried in the county where such
obligation is to be performed or in which the defendant resides.
History: •L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-4.
Cross-References. - Oral contracts, limitation of action, § 78-12-25.

Written

§ 78-12-23.

contracts,

limitation

of action,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Place of performance.
Plaintiffs option.
Specific actions.
Transfer of cause to proper county.
Constitutionality.
Predecessor section did not violate former
Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5. Snyder v. Pike,
30 Utah 102, 83 P. 692 (1905). But see Brown
v. Bach, 17 Utah 435, 53 P. 991 (1898).
Place of performance.
Mere reference to residence or place of business in writing, having no reference to place of
performance, is not sufficient to bring writing
within this section. Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah
203, 41 P.2d 281 (1935).
For the purpose of venue, the place where
the defendant is to perform the obligation must
be determinable from either the express terms
of the written agreement or from the necessary
implication of those terms. Palfreyman v.
Trueman, 105 Utah 463, 142 P.2d 677 (1943).
Plaintiffs option.
Party bringing the action has the option to
choose the county of contracted performance,
or the county of residence of defendant, if he
resides in a different county from that of
agreed performance, in which to lodge his
venue. Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203, 41 P.2d

281 (1935); Palfreyman v. Trueman, 105 Utah
463, 142 P.2d 677 (1943); Simmons v. Hoyt,
109 Utah 186, 167 P.2d 27 (1946).
Where contract performance was due in Salt
Lake County and defendants resided in Cache
County, plaintiff had the option of suing defendants on the contract in either Salt Lake or
Cache County; trial court did not have prerogative to grant defendant's motion for change of
venue to Cache County where plaintiff had
chosen to sue in Salt Lake County. Walker
Bank & Trust Co. v. Walker, 631 P.2d 860
(Utah 1981).
Specific actions.
Principal in undertaking given in replevin
action was entitled to have action on undertaking brought in county of its residence where
undertaking, neither by express terms nor necessary implication, provided that it was to be
performed in a specific county. Atlas Accep•
tance Corp. v. Pratt, 85 Utah 352, 39 P.2d 710
(1935); Palfreyman v. Trueman, 105 Utah 463,
142 P.2d 677 (1943); Simmons v. Hoyt, 109
Utah 186, 167 P.2d 27 (1946).
Action to foreclose chattel mortgage given as
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JUDICIAL CODE

security for payment of promissory notes made
payable in Salt Lake County could be properly
maintained in Salt Lake County, although
mortgaged property was not situated in such
county and defendant resided in another
county. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co.
v. Giles, 53 Utah 539, 174 P. 181 (1918).
This section does not apply to action to rescind contract because of fraud since the action
was not brought to enforce any terms of the
contract or the obligations contained therein,
but rather to determine whether a contract
subsisted. Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court,
2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168, 46 A.L.R.2d 887
(1954).
Since this section expressly deals with written contracts, it excludes from its application
actions on contracts not in writing. Buckle v.
Ogden Furn. & Carpet Co., 61 Utah 559, 216 P.
684 (1923).
Transfer of cause to proper county.
Where contract for installation of sound re-

producing equipment did not state where contract was to be performed or where payment
was to be made, order transferring action to
county in which defendants resided was
proper. Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203, 41 P.2d
281 (1935); Palfreyman v. Trueman, 105 Utah
463, 142 P.2d 677 (1943); Simmons v. Hoyt,
109 Utah 186, 167 P.2d 27 (1946).
Where terms of contract do not expressly
provide the place at which defendant is to perform his obligations, and where there is nothing in the terms from which it must necessarily be implied that they be performed in any
particular place, the court should grant a motion for change of venue to defendant's place of
residence when the petition is filed with the
required affidavits of residence and merit and
no traverse and no objections to the sufficiency
of the affidavits are made. Palfreyman v.
Trueman, 105 Utah 463, 142 P.2d 677 (1943).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue§ 20.
C.J.S. - 92 C.J.S. Venue § 92 et seq.
A.L.R. - Venue of damage action for breach
of real estate sales contract, 8 A.L.R.3d 489.

78-13-5.

Contractual provision limiting place or court
in which action may be brought, 31 A.L.R.4th
404.
Key Numbers. - Venue e=- 7.5.

Transitory actions -

Residence of corporations.

All transitory causes of action arising without this state, except those mentioned in the next succeeding section [§ 78-13-6), shall, if action is brought
thereon in this state, be brought and tried in the county where any defendant
in such action resides; and if any such defendant is a corporation, any county
in which such corporation has an office or place of business shall be deemed
the county in which such corporation resides, within the meaning of this
section.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-5.
Cross-References.
Corporate directors

or stockholders, limitation of actions against,
§ 78-12-27.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Waiver.

Federal Employers' Liability Act.
District Court of Third Judicial District of
Salt Lake County had jurisdiction of cause of
action arising outside the state, brought under
Federal Employers' Liability Act by nonresident plaintiff against foreign corporation having principal place of business in state, in Salt

Lake County; but neither the Federal Employers' Liability Act nor other federal statutes
made it mandatory that court exercise jurisdiction even though in the first instance the cause
of action was properly instituted. Mooney v.
Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d
628 (1950).
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Waiver.
Predecessor section did not go to jurisdiction
of subject· matter, but merely conferred privilege on defendant which could be waived by

filing general demurrer to complaint. Farnsworth v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 32 Utah 112, 89
P. 74 (1907); Stone v. Union Pac. R.R., 32 Utah
185, 89 P. 715 (1907).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations
§ 2180 et seq.; 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue §§ 2, 5.
C.J.S. - 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1295; 92
C.J.S. Venue §§ 7, 85, 86.

Key Numbers.
Venue ,s:, 4, 28, 29.

Corporations

,s:,

503;

78-13-6. Arising without this state in favor of resident.
All transitory causes of action arising without this state in favor of residents of this state shall, if action is brought thereon in this state, be brought
and tried in the county where the plaintiff resides, or in the county where the
principal defendant resides, or if the principal defendant is a corporation, then
in the county where the plaintiff resides or in the county where such corporation has an office or place of business, subject, however, to a change of venue
as provided by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-6.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assignments.
Plaintiffs option to choose where to bring action.
Transitory actions.

Assignments.
Whenever a cause of action is assigned without consideration, the assignor remains and
continues to be the real party in interest, the
assignee is merely a trustee or collection agent,
and the assignor, the real party in interest, is
the person in whose favor the cause of action
arises. Dee v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 50
Utah 167, 167 P. 246 (1917).
Plaintiff's option to choose where to bring
action.
Where Utah plaintiff sued defendant corporation, which had its principal place of business in Weber County, Utah, on a transitory
cause of action arising without Utah, the plaintiff had the option under this section to choose

where to bring suit, and where he chose to
bring suit in his county ofresidence the district
court had no prerogative to change venue to
Weber County upon defendant's request.
Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229
(Utah 1983).

Transitory actions.
Where both parties resided in Utah, and
owned adjoining lands in Idaho, an action for
damages growing out of the eating and destruction of wheat in stacks by defendant's cattle was transitory, because wheat cut and severed from the realty and put in stacks becomes
personal property. Allen v. Allen, 47 Utah 145,
151 P. 982 (1915).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue§ 37.
C.J.S. - 92 C.J.S. Venue § 79.
Key Numbers. - Venue ,s:, 3, 4.
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JUDICIAL CODE

All other actions.

In all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which the cause
of action arises, or in the county in which any defendant resides at the commencement of the action; provided, that if any such defendant is a corporation,
any county in which such corporation has its principal office or place of business shall be deemed the county in which such corporation resides within the
meaning of this section. If none of the defendants resides in this state, such
action may be commenced and tried in any county which the plaintiff may
designate in his complaint; and if the defendant is about to depart from the
state, such action may be tried in any county where any of the parties resides
or service is had, subject, however, to the power of the court to change the
place of trial as provided by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Complaint.
Mandamus.
Plaintiffs option.
Residence of corporations.
Right to be sued at residence.
Specific actions.
Cited.

Complaint.
For the purposes of venue, and venue only,
complaint will be regarded rather liberally in
favor of the pleader, in determining whether it
states a cause of action in tort or in contract.
Schramm-Johnson Drugs v. Cox, 79 Utah 276,
9 P.2d 399 (1932).
Mandamus.
Mandamus could issue to enforce rights
guaranteed by predecessor section. Pace v.
Wolfe, 76 Utah 368, 289 P. 1102 (1930).
Plaintiff's option.
Under this section, plaintiff does not have
option of choosing county, and if he brings action in wrong county he must yield to a change
of venue when properly and timely demanded.
Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203, 41 P.2d 281
(1935).
Residence of corporations.
Residence of domestic mining corporation,
for purposes of venue, was in county where its
principal office was located and where its principal and general business was carried on.
Crookston v. Centennial Eureka Mining Co.,
13 Utah 117, 44 P. 714 (1896).
Right to be sued at residence.
Where the plaintiff lender bank, in an action

to obtain a deficiency judgment, had availed
itself of the resources of the district court in the
county in which the borrower resided, it
waived any objection it may have had to a
change of venue from the county of its residence to the county of the borrower's residence.
Dixie State Bank v. Johnston, 714 P.2d 1159
(Utah 1986).

Specific Actions.
Principal in undertaking given in replevin
action was entitled to have action on undertaking brought in county of its residence where
undertaking, neither by express terms nor necessary implication, provided that it was to be
performed in a specific county. Atlas Acceptance Corp. v. Pratt, 85 Utah 352, 39 P.2d 710
(1935).
Venue of appeals from department of registration (now Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing) to district courts was governed by predecessor section, except in so far as
former§ 58-1-36 (see now§ 58-1-19) conflicted
therewith. Baker v. Department of Registration, 78 Utah 424, 3 P.2d 1082 (1931).
Where contract for sale and delivery of water
was entered into in one county and purchase
price was payable in another, venue of action
on contract lay in latter county after demand
and refusal for payment in that county. Hecla
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Gold Mining Co. v. Gisborn, 21 Utah 68, 59 P.
518 (1899).
An action upon an implied promise of indemnity is •properly brought where breach occurred. Hoggan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 P.
512, 99 Am. St. R. 837 (1903).
Where contract for installation of sound reproducing equipment did not state where contract was to be performed or where payment
was to be made, order transferring action to
county in which defendants resided was
proper, and plaintiffs could not for first time on
appeal raise issue of insufficiency of affidavit of
merits. Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203, 41 P.2d
281 (1935).
Plaintiff had right of election to institute action for conversion of goods either in county
where cause of action arose or in county where
defendant resided; and where plaintiff electing
county where cause of action arose, defendant
had no right to c~use action to be transferred to

78-13-8

county in which defendant resided on ground
that county designated was not proper county.
Hale v. Barker, 70 Utah 284,259 P. 928 (1927).
Venue of action for rescission of real estate
sale contract on ground of fraudulent misrepresentation was determined by allegations of
complaint where defendant did not specifically
deny allegations that fraudulent statements
were made in a particular county. Calder v.
Third Judicial Dist. Court, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273
P.2d 168, 46 A.L.R.2d 887 (1954).
If alleged wrongful acts were committed in
Salt Lake County, but the alleged resulting injury occurred in Beaver County, the cause of
action arose in both counties, and could be
commenced in either; hence, it was properly
commenced in Beaver County. Schramm-Johnson Drugs v. Cox, 79 Utah 276, 9 P.2d 399
(1932).
Cited in Hatch v. Davis, 725 P.2d 1334
(Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - The Utah Law of Oil
and Gas, 7 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 191 (1986).
Am. Jur. 2d. - 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 22
et seq.

C.J.S. - 92 C.J.S. Venue §§ 79, 82.
A.L.R. - Venue of civil libel action against
newspaper or periodical, 15 A.L.R.3d 1249.
Key Numbers. - Venue -s=> 2, 3.

78-13-8.

Conditions precedent.

Change of venue -

If the county in
the trial thereof,
defendant at the
writing, that the

which the action is commenced is not the proper county for
the action may nevertheless be tried therein, unless tlre
time he answers or otherwise appears files a motion, in
trial be had in the proper county.

History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-8.

Cross-References. - Calamity, change of
place of trial because of, § 78-7-12.
Change of venue in circuit court, § 78-4-8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Construction.
Mandamus.
Prohibition.
Request for change of venue.
-Affidavit of merits.
-Contents.
-Form.
-Time.
-Waiver.
Construction.
This section is procedural and should be

given a liberal construction. Floor v. Mitchell,
86 Utah 203, 41 P.2d 281 (1935).
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Mandamus.
If it is the plain duty of the court to grant a
change of place of trial, mandamus will issue
to require it. Pace v. Wolfe, 76 Utah 368, 289
P. 1102 (1930).
Prohibition.
Where physician appealed from order of department of registration (now Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing) revoking
his license to wrong county and stipulations
conceded that it was wrong county, and district
court of such county allowed change of venue
to correct county, writ of prohibition held
proper remedy to prevent court from dismissing appeal since any other remedy was inadequate; mistake in taking appeal to wrong
county did not deprive district court of jurisdiction subject to the right to change of venue as
provided by law. Cragun v. Second Dist. Court
ex rel. Weber County, 83 Utah 456, 30 P.2d
205 (1933).
Request for change of venue.
-Affidavit of merits.
Where corporation failed to file affidavit of
merits as required by predecessor section, trial
court's refusal of corporation's demand for
change of venue to county in which it had its
principal and only place of business was not
error. Baker v. Glenwood Mining Co., 82 Utah
100, 21 P.2d 889 (1933).
Where contract for installation of sound reproducing equipment did not state where contract was to be performed or where payment
was to be made, order transferring action to
county in which defendants resided was
proper, and plaintiffs could not for first time on
appeal raise issue of insufficiency of affidavit of

merits under predecessor statute. Floor v.
Mitchell, 86 Utah 203, 41 P.2d 281 (1935).

-Contents.
If motion or application for change of venue
is based on the ground that action is brought in
the wrong county, it should negative conditions under which such county may have been
the proper county. Dee v. San Pedro, L.A. &
S.L.R.R., 50 Utah 167, 167 P. 246 (1917).
-Form.
This statute clearly provides that objection
to venue is made by motion for change of place
of trial rather than by motion to dismiss. Any
implication in U.R.C.P. 41(b) that venue is
properly tested by a motion to dismiss is apparently an inadvertence from copying the federal
rules after which the Utah rules are patterned.
Cannon v. Tuft, 3 Utah 2d 410, 285 P.2d 843
(1955).
-Time.
The time when right to demand a change of
place of trial must be asserted is at defendant's
first appearance. Pace v. Wolfe, 76 Utah 368,
289 P. 1102 (1930).
This section requires a defendant to file a
motion for change of venue at his first appearance; making any other motion or appearance
prior thereto usually forecloses defendant from
thereafter objecting to venue. Rudd v. Crown
International, 26 Utah 2d 263, 488 P.2d 298
(1971).
-Waiver.
Failure to make motion for change of venue
constitutes waiver of any right to object to action being instituted in improper county.
Baker Lumber Co. v. A.A. Clark Co., 53 Utah
336, 178 P. 764 (1919).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue§ 51.
C.J.S. - 92 C.J.S. Venue §§ 139, 216.
A.L.R. - Change of venue justified by fact
that large number of inhabitants of local juris-

78-13-9.

diction have interest adverse to party to action,
10 A.L.R.4th 1046.
Key Numbers. - Venue eao 77.

Grounds.

The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the following cases:
(1) when the county designated in the complaint is not the proper
county.
(2) when there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be
had in the county, city, or precinct designated in the complaint.
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be
promoted by the change.
(4) when all the parties to an action, by stipulation or by consent in
open court entered in the minutes, agree that the place of trial may be
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changed to another county. Thereupon the court must order the change as
agreed upon.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-9.

Cross-References. - Disqualification
judges, § 78-7-1; U.R.C.P. 63(b).

of

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeal.
Assignment of cause of action.
Convenience and ends of justice.
Discretion of trial court.
Impartial trial.
Improper county in complaint.
Mandamus.
Prohibition.
Waiver.
Appeal.
Where question relating to propriety of
changing place of trial under former statute
was not properly saved for review, presumption on appeal was that change was properly
made. Utah Bond & Share Co. v. Chappel, 68
Utah 530, 251 P. 354 (1926).
On appeal from judgment in main cause, appellant may obtain review of ruling denying
motion for a change of the place of trial.
Schramm.Johnson Drugs v. Cox, 79 Utah 276,
9 P.2d 399 (1932).
Assignment of cause of action.
Assignment of a cause of action, either with
or without consideration, made solely to confer
jurisdiction on the court in which the action is
commenced, thereby depriving defendant of
the privilege afforded by statutes relating to
venue, will not prevail against a proper proceeding to change the place of trial. Dee v. San
Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 50 Utah 167, 167 P.
246 (1917).
Convenience and ends of justice.
Discretionary power of the trial court to dismiss cause for reasons of inconvenience should
only be exercised in exceptional circumstances
and when an adequate showing has been made
that the interests of justice require a trial in a
more convenient forum. Mooney v. Denver &
R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628
(1950).
In action under Federal Employers' Liability
Act by nonresident against ~oreign corporation
to recover for personal injuries sustained in
Colorado, evidence failed to warrant dismissal
of cause upon grounds of forum non conveniens. Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 118
Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628 (1950).

Discretion of trial court.
An application for a change of the place of
trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, and its action will not be disturbed
on appeal unless a case of manifest abuse of
discretion is shown. Winters v. Turner, 74
Utah 222, 278 P. 816 (1929), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 281 U.S. 692, 50 S. Ct. 238, 74
L. Ed. 1121 (1930).
Impartial trial.
In action against a sheriff for damages for an
alleged pummeling administered to plaintiff
incident to his arrest, it was not an abuse of
discretion to deny plaintiffs motion for a
change of venue based on fact that sheriff was
an elected official, that he was a member of one
of the oldest families in the county, and that he
had many friends in the county. Chamblee v.
Stocks & Tibbetts, 9 Utah 2d 342, 344 P.2d 980
(1959).
Motion for change of venue is properly denied when made on mere assertion by plaintiff
that defendant would be well known to jurors
in the county, especially where the court excluded from panel anyone indicating bias or
prejudice or unwillingness to sit on case. C.R.
Owens Trucking Corp. v. Stewart, 29 Utah 2d
353, 509 P.2d 821 (1973).
Improper county in complaint.
Right to change of venue upon ground that
county designated in complaint is not proper
county, when facts are clear, is a substantial
right, and when properly demanded it is reversible error to deny it. Buckle v. Ogden
Furn. & Carpet Co., 61 Utah 559, 216 P. 684
(1923).
Mandamus.
Mandamus may issue to require a change of
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venue. Pace v. Wolfe, 76 Utah 368, 289 P. 1102
(1930).
Prohibition.
Where physician appealed from order of department of registration (now Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing) revoking
his license to wrong county and stipulations
conceded that it was wrong county, and district
court of such county allowed change of venue
to correct county, writ of prohibition held
proper remedy to prevent court from dismissing appeal since any other remedy was inadequate; and mistake in taking appeal to wrong
county did not deprive district court of jurisdiction subject to right to change of venue as provided by law. Cragun v. Second Dist. Court ex
rel. Weber County, 83 Utah 456, 30 P.2d 205
(1934).
Waiver.
Where an application for a change of venue

on the ground of prejudice of inhabitants of the
county where case was to be tried was not
made before trial, the objection was unavailable. Anderson v. Mammoth Mining Co., 26
Utah 357, 73 P. 412 (1903).
Failure to make motion or demand for
change of trial waived any right party might
have had for change of venue. Baker Lumber
Co. v. A.A. Clark Co., 53 Utah 336, 178 P. 764
(1919).
If an action is brought in the wrong county,
defendant's remedy is by affidavit or otherwise
to apply for a change of place of trial to the
proper county. In such case, a failure to present
a motion or otherwise ask for a change of place
of trial is a waiver of the right to have the
place of trial changed. Kramer v. Pixton, 72
Utah 1, 268 P. 1029 (1928).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 58
et seq.
C.J.S. - 92 C.J.S. Venue § 138 et seq.

78-13-10.

A.L.R. - Pretrial publicity in criminal case
as ground for change of venue, 33 A.L.R.3d 17.
Key Numbers. - Venue
45 et seq.

Court to which transfer is to be made.

If any action or proceeding is commenced or is pending in a court and the
court orders the place of trial to be changed, it must be transferred for trial to
a court the parties may agree upon by stipulation in writing or made in open
court and entered in the minutes, or if they do not so agree, then to the
nearest court where like objection or cause for making the order does not
exist.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-10.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Transfer on court's own motion.
-Appeal.
Waiver of objection to transfer.
Transfer on court's own motion.
If a transfer is made on the court's own motion, there is a presumption in favor of the regularity and legality of its action. In re
Whitmore, 9 Utah 441, 35 P. 524 (1894).

its own motion, the presumption on appeal is
that the parties did not agree, and that there
was good cause known to the judge for transferring the cause to the "nearest court". Elliot
v. Whitmore, 10 Utah 246, 37 P. 461 (1894).

-Appeal.
An order made by court on its own motion,
changing place of trial, is an appealable order.
Elliot v. Whitmore, 10 Utah 246, 37 P. 461
(1894).
If the court changes the place of trial upon

Waiver of objection to transfer.
If no objection is made to jurisdiction of court
to which case was transferred by court on its
own motion, or to any of the proceedings growing out of order changing place of trial, it is
waived; objection comes too late if made for
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first time in Supreme Court. Elliot v.
Whitmore, 10 Utah 246, 37 P. 461 (1894).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue§ 88.
C.J.S. - 92 C.J.S. Venue § 197.
Key Numbers. - Venue e=o74.

78-13-11.

Duty of clerkdiction.

Fees and costs-

Effect on juris-

When an order is made transferring an action or proceeding for trial, the
court must transmit the pleadings and papers therein to the court to which it
is transferred. The costs and fees therefor and filing the papers anew must be
paid by the party at whose instance the order was made; provided, that when
such order is made for the reason that the cause was commenced in the wrong
county, the costs of transfer and filing the papers anew shall be paid by the
plaintiff in the action within ten days after the making of such order, or said
cause shall be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The court to which an action
or proceeding is transferred shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction as if
it had been originally commenced therein.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-11.
Cross-References. - Adjustment of costs

between counties for change of venue,
§ 17-15-19.
Fee of clerk on change of venue, § 21-2-2.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue§ 90.
C.J.S. - 92 C.J.S. Venue § 207.
Key Numbers. - Venue e=o79, 80.

CHAPTER 14
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
Section
78-14-1.
78-14-2.

Short title of act.
Legislative findings and declarations - Purpose of act.
Definition of terms.
78-14-3.
Statute of limitations - Excep78-14-4.
tions - Application.
78-14-4.5. Amount of award reduced by
amounts of collateral sources
available to plaintiff - No reduction
where
subrogation
right
exists
Collateral
sources defined - Procedure to
preserve subrogation rights Evidence admissible - Exceptions.

Section
78-14-5.

Failure to obtain informed consent
- Proof required of patient Defenses - Consent to health
care.
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee,
warranty, contract or assurance
of result.
Ad damnum clause prohibited in
78-14-7.
complaint.
78-14-7.1. Limitation of award of noneconomic damages in malpractice
actions.
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in malpractice action.
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Notice of intent to commence action.
Professional liability
insurance
coverage for providers - Insurance commissioner may require
joint underwriting authority.
Periodic payment of future damages
in malpractice actions.
Actions under Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.
Act not retroactive - Exception.
Department of Business Regulation to provide panel - Procedures established by department - Procedures for requesting panel - Notice - Statute
of limitations tolled - Composition of panel - Members to
receive per diem and travel expenses - Department autho-

78-14-1.

Section

78-14-13.
78-14-14.
78-14-15.

78-14-16.

rized to set license fees of
health care providers to cover
costs of administering panel.
Proceedings - Authority of panel
- Rights of parties to proceedings.
Decision and recommendations of
panel - No judicial or other review.
Evidence of proceedings not admissible in subsequent action Panelist may not be compelled
to testify - Immunity of panelist from civil liability.
Proceedings considered a binding
arbitration hearing upon written agreement of parties Compensation to members of
panel.

Short title of act.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act."
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 1.
Meaning of "this act". - The phrase "this

act," referred to in this section, means Laws
1976, Chapter 23, which enacted this chapter.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - A New Perspective Has Utah Entered the Twentieth Century in
Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 495.
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1986
Utah L. Rev. 95, 199.
Journal of Contemporary Law. - Medical Malpractice Legislation: Rx for Utah, 11 J.
Contemp. L. 287 (1984).
A.L.R. - Liability of hospital or clinic for
sexual relationships with patients by staff physicians, psychologists, and other healers, 45
A.L.R.4th 289.

78-14-2.

Judicial power to order discontinuance of
life-sustaining treatment, 48 A.L.R.4th 67.
Physician's tort liability for unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information about patient, 48 A.L.R.4th 668.
Medical malpractice: res ipsa loquitur in
negligent anesthesia cases, 49 A.L.R.4th 63.
When does medical practitioner's treatment
of patient constitute "willful and malicious injury," so as to make practitioner's debt arising
from such treatment nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(6) of Bankruptcy Act (11 USCS
§ 523(a)(6)), 77 A.L.R. Fed. 918.

Legislative findings and declarations
of act.

-

Purpose

The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for
damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health
care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the
insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and increased
claims is increased care cost, both through the health care providers passing
the cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing
defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a
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lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of
malpractice insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health care
system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures
designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide
health-related malpractice insurance while at the same time establishing a
mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care providers
while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability
insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of
claims.
History: 1.. 1976, ch. 23, § 2.
Meaning of "this act". - The phrase "this
act", referred to in the last paragraph, means

Laws 1976, Chapter 23, which enacted this
chapter.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Journal of Contemporary Law. - Medical Malpractice Legislation: Rx for Utah, 11 J.
Contemp. L. 287 (1984).

78-14-3.

Definition

of terms.

As used in this act:
(1) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association, corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered
or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital, physician, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist,
dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic physician,
naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician and
surgeon, audiologist, speech pathologist, certified social worker, social
service worker, social service aide, marriage and family counselor, or
practitioner of obstetrics, and others rendering similar care and services
relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of
persons, and officers, employees, or agents of any of the above acting in
the course and scope of their employment.
(2) "Hospital" means a public or private institution licensed under the
Hospital Licensing Act.
(3) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine and surgery as provided in Subsection 58-12-3(1).
(4) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to practice professional
nursing as provided in § 58-31-9.
(5) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed to practice as a
licensed practical nurse as provided in § 58-31-10.
(6) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to practice nurse-midwifery as provided in § 58-13-17 [§ 58-44-4).
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(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as defined in

§ 58-7-6.

(8) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to practice dental hygiene as defined in § 58-8-9 [§ 58-7-1.1].
(9) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice optometry as
defined in § 58-16-11.
(10) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy as
provided in § 58-17-2.
(11) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physical
therapy as provided in § 58-24-6.
(12) "Podiatrist" means a person licensed to practice chiropody as defined in § 58-5-12.
(13) "Psychologist" means a person licensed to practice psychology as
defined in 58-25-4.
(14) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to practice chiropractic as provided in Subsection 58-12-3(3).
(15) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice naturopathy as defined in § 58-12-22.
(16) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice osteopathy as provided in § 58-12-6.
(17) "Osteopathic physician and surgeon" means a person licensed to
practice osteopathy as provided in § 58-12-7.
(18) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology as
provided in § 58-1-5.
(19) "Speech pathologist" means a person licensed to practice speech
pathology as provided in § 58-1-5.
(20) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a
certified social worker as provided in § 58-35-5.
(21) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to practice as a
social service worker as provided in § 58-35-5.
(22) "Social service aide" means a person licensed to practice as a social
service aide as provided in § 58-35-5.
(23) "Marriage and family counselor" means a person licensed to practice as a marriage counselor or family counselor as provided in § 58-39-6.
(24) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice
obstetrics in this state a~ provided in Subsection 58-12-3(5).
(25) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care
provider, under a contract, express or implied.
(26) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided
in § 31A-2-102.
(27) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other legal agent of the patient.
(28) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or
unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to another.
(29) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of
warranty, wrongful death or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should
have been rendered by the health care provider.
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(30) "Health care" means any act, or treatment performed or furnished,
or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care,
treatment or confinement.
(31) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment,
care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 3; L. 1985, ch.
242, § 56.
Meaning of "this act". - The phrase "this
act", referred to in the introductory language,
means Laws 1976, Chapter 23, which enacted
this chapter.
Compiler's Notes. - Section 58-13-17, re-

78-14-4.

ferred to in Subsection (6), was repealed by
Laws 1953, ch. 94, § 1. A definition of "certified nurse midwife" now appears in § 58-44-4.
Section 58-8-9, referred to in Subsection (8),
was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 13, § 1. A definition of "practice of dental hygiene" now appears in § 58-7-1.1.

Statute of limitations
tion.

-

Exceptions

-

Applica-

(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider
is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body,
the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left
in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of
minority or other legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion
of time allowed under former law; but any action which under former law
could have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of
this act may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of
this act.
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History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 4; 1979, ch. 128,

§ 1.

Compiler's Notes. - The phrase "effective
date of this act", referred to in Subsection (2),

means the effective date of Laws 1976, Chapter
23, which became effective April 1, 1976.
Cross-References. - Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in malpractice actions,
§ 78-12-47.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Fraudulent concealment.
Minors.
When statute begins to run.
-Discovery of injury.
-Foreign object left in body.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
This section does not violate the equal protection of the law requirements of Utah Const.,
Art. I, Sec. 24, and it is not an unconstitutional
"special law" in violation of Utah Const., Art.
VI, Sec. 26. Allen v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981).
Provision of this section that statute of limitations is not tolled because of injured party's
minority does not violate equal protection of
laws, does not violate due process of law, and
does not violate the open courts provisions of
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 11. Hargett v.
Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984).
Fraudulent concealment.
Where physician continued to treat patient
after removing her tonsils, representing that
her throat condition would clear up, defense of
limitations was not available to physician in
malpractice action, since his representations
were in nature of fraudulent concealment of
plaintiffs cause of action and statute of limitations did not begin to run until falsity of such
representations
was discovered. Peteler v.
Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932).
Minors.
Medical malpractice action against a doctor
for alleged negligent diagnosis and treatment
of a child was barred by this section's statute of
limitations where action was brought by
child's mother individually and as guardian ad
litem for child more than two years after
mother discovered legal injury to child.

Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah
1984).
When statute begins to run.
Statute begins to run when an injured person knows or should know that he has suffered
a legal injury. Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144
(Utah 1979); Magoc v. Hooker, 796 F.2d 377
(10th Cir. 1986).
Statute of limitations provided in this section begins to run when plaintiff is aware of
facts that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that he may have a cause of action
against health care provider; a legal determination of negligence is not necessary to start
statute of limitations running. Hargett v.
Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984).
-Discovery
of injury.
In this section, the term discovery of "injury"
means discovery of the injury and the negligence which resulted in the injury; i.e., "injury" means legal injury. Foil v. Ballinger, 601
P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).
-Foreign object left in body.
Where foreign object was negligently left in
body of patient during operation and patient
was thus ignorant of right of action for malpractice, cause of action did not accrue until
patient learned of presence of such foreign object. Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199, 436
P.2d 435 (1968).
Cited in Hargett v. Limberg (10th Cir. 1986)
801 F.2d 368.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 649.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians,
Surgeons, and Other Healers § 316 et seq.
C.J.S. - 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions

§ 74; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions§§

174,
183 et seq.; 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons
§ 60.
A.L.R. - Applicability, in action against
nurse in her professional capacity, of statute of
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limitations
applicable to malpractice, 8
A.L.R.3d 1336.
When statute of limitations commences to
run against malpractice action based on leaving foreign substance in patient's body, 70
A.L.R.3d 7.
Amendment purporting to change the nature
of the action or theory of recovery, made after
statute of limitations has run, as relating back
to filing of original complaint, 70 A.L.R.3d 82.
Statute of limitations relating to medical
malpractice actions as applicable to actions
against unlicensed practitioner, 70 A.L.R.3d
114.

78-14-4.5.
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When statute of limitations begins to run
against malpractice action in connection with
sterilization or birth control procedures, 93
A.L.R.3d 218.
Time of discovery as affecting running of
statute oflimitations in wrongful death action,
49 A.L.R.4th 972.
Medical malpractice: applicability of "foreign object" exception in medical malpractice
statutes of limitations, 50 A.L.R.4th 250.
Key Numbers. - Limitation of Actions €=>
31, 40, 55(3); Physicians and Surgeons €=>
18(1½).

Amount of award reduced by amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiffNo reduction
where subrogation right exists - Collateral
sources defined - Procedure to preserve subrogation rights - Evidence admissible - Exceptions.

(1) In all malpractice actions against health care providers as defined in
Subsection 78-14-3(29) in which damages are awarded to compensate the
plaintiff for losses sustained, the court shall reduce the amount of such award
by the total of all amounts paid to the plaintiff from all collateral sources
which are available to him; however, there shall be no reduction for collateral
sources for which a subrogation right exists as provided in this section nor
shall there be a reduction for any collateral payment not included in the
award of damages. Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by
the trier of fact, the court shall receive evidence concerning the total amounts
of collateral sources which have been paid to or for the benefit of the plaintiff
or are otherwise available to him. The court shall also take testimony of any
amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited by, or on behalf of the
plaintiff or members of his immediate family to secure his right to any collateral source benefit which he is receiving as a result of his injury, and shall
offset any reduction in the award by such amounts. No evidence shall be
received and no reduction made with respect to future collateral source benefits except as specified in Subsection (4).
(2) For purposes of this section "collateral source" means payments made to
or for the benefit of the plaintiff for:
(a) medical expenses and disability payments payable under the
United States Social Security Act, any federal, state, or local income
disability act, or any other public program, except the federal programs
which are required by law to seek subrogation;
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability insurance, automobile
accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage, and any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance
benefits available to the plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or
provided by others;
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, group, organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs ofhospi-
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tal, medical, dental, or other health care services, except benefits received
as gifts, contributions, or assistance made gratuitously; and
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by
employers or any other system intended to provide wages during a period
of disability.
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or received prior to
settlement or judgment, a provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30
days before settlement or trial of the action a written notice upon each health
care provider against whom the malpractice action has been asserted. The
written notice shall state the name and address of the provider of collateral
sources, the amount of collateral sources paid, the names and addresses of all
persons who received payment, and the items and purposes for which payment
has been made.
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs that provide payments
or benefits available in the future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the
extent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of the
likelihood or unlikelihood that such programs, payments, or benefits will be
available in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact may consider such
evidence in determining the amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for
future expenses.
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to recover the amounts of
such benefits from a health care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or
entity as reimbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judgment, including any payments made under Chapter 19, Title 26,
except to the extent that subrogation rights to amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are preserved as provided in this section. All policies of
insurance providing benefits affected by this section are construed in accordance with this section.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-4.5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 237, § 1.
Effective Dates. - Section 2 of Laws 1985,

78-14-5.

ch. 237 provided: "This act takes effect on July
1, 1985."

Failure to obtain informed consent - Proof required of patient - Defenses - Consent to health
care.

(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that what the health care provider did was either
expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages
from a health care provider in an action based upon the provider's failure to
obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the following:
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient
and health care provider; and
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient; and
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care
rendered; and
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious harm; and
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk;
and
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(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not
have consented to the health care rendered after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to the decision to give consent. In determining what a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would do
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of the
patient before health care was provided and before the occurrence of any
personal injuries alleged to have arisen from said health care; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by the patient.
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health care
provider based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent if:
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered was
relatively minor; or
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from the health care provider
was commonly known to the public; or
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the health care complained of,
that he would accept the health care involved regardless of the risk; or
that he aid not want to be informed of the matters to which he would be
entitled to be informed; or
(d) the health care provider, after considering all of the attendant facts
and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably
believed that additional disclosures could be expected to have a substantial and adverse effect on the patient's condition; or
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written consent which
sets forth the nature and purpose of the intended health care and which
contains a declaration that the patient accepts the risk of substantial and
serious harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of
health care and which acknowledges that health care providers involved
have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory manner and that all questions asked about the health care and its
attendant risks have been answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient or his representative; such written consent shall be a defense to an
action against a health care provider based upon failure to obtain informed consent unless the patient proves that the person giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or shows by clear and convincing proof
that the execution of the written consent was induced by the defendant's
affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission
to state material facts.
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prevent any person
eighteen years of age or over from refusing to consent to health care for his
own person upon personal or religious grounds.
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to consent to any
health care not prohibited by law:
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his minor child;
(b) any married person, for a spouse;
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether formally
serving or not, for the minor under his care and any guardian for his
ward;
(d) any person eighteen years of age or over for his or her parent who is
unable by reason of age, physical or mental condition, to provide such
consent;
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(e) any patient eighteen years of age or over;
(f) any female regardless of age or marital status, when given in connection with her pregnancy or childbirth;
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his minor brother or sister;
and
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandparent for his minor grandchild.
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes health care treatment or procedures for another as provided by this act shall be subject to civil
liability.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 5.
Meaning of "this act". - The phrase "this
act", referred to in Subsections (3) and (5),
means Laws 1976, Chapter 23, which enacted
this chapter and § 78-14-11 and amended
§§ 31-3-1, 31-5-21, and 78-12-28.
Cross-References. - Abortion, informed
consent requirements, §§ 76-7-305, 76-7-305.5.

Blood donation by minor over eighteen, parental consent not required, § 15-2-5.
Sterilization, informed consent for procedure, § 64-10-1.
Venereal disease, minor's power to consent
to treatment, § 26-6-18.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Pregnancy and childbirth.
-Husband's
consent.
Proof required.

In general.
This section merely sets forth the factual
showing required for a patient to recover damages from a health care provider for failure to
obtain "informed consent," and establishes a
safe harbor for health care providers relative to
informed consent in the context of civil malpractice litigation. It does not constitute a general consent law mandating parental consent
for family planning services as well as other
kinds of medical care. Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Dandoy, 635 F. Supp. 184 (D. Utah
1986).

Pregnancy and childbirth.
-Husband's
consent.
Where married pregnant woman is in full
possession of her faculties, she alone has the
power to submit to surgical procedures upon
herself; husband's consent to such medical procedures is not required. Reiser v. Lobner, 641
P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).
Proof required.
To make out a prima facie case of failure to
obtain informed consent, the patient must
prove all of the statutory elements in Subsection (1). Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245
(Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Brigham Young Law Review. - California Supreme Court Expands the Informed Consent Doctrine; Physicians Have a Duty to Obtain an Informed Refusal: Truman v. Thomas,
1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 933. '

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians,
Surgeons, and Other Healers § 200 et seq.
C.J.S. - 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons
§ 48.
Key Numbers. - Physicians and Surgeons
e:, 15(8), 16.
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Writing required as basis for liability for breach
of guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of
result.

No liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider on the basis of
an alleged breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be
obtained from any health care rendered unless the guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance is set forth in writing and signed by the health care provider or an authorized agent of the provider.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 6.
Cross-References. - Blood transfusions,

procurement and use of blood a service rather
than a sale, § 26-31-1.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 37 C.J.S. Statute of Frauds§§
170 et seq. •

78-14-7.

32,

Key Numbers. 97.

Ad damnum clause prohibited

Statute of Frauds

,s=

37,

in complaint.

No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer of a complaint filed in a
malpractice action against a health care provider. The complaint shall merely
pray for such damages as are reasonable in the premises.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 7.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 51 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians,
Surgeons, and Other Healers § 367 et seq.
C.J.S. - 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons
§ 67.

78-14-7.1.

,s=

Key Numbers. - Physicians and Surgeons
18(11).

Limitation of award of noneconomic
malpractice actions.

damages in

In a malpractice action aga_inst a health care provider, an injured plaintiff
may recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience. In no case shall the amount of damages awarded for such noneconomic loss exceed $250,000. This limitation does not affect awards of punitive
damages.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-7.1, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 205, § 1.
Effective Dates. - Section 2 of Laws 1986,

ch. 205 provided: "This act takes effect on July
1, 1987."

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Future disease or condition, or
anxiety relating thereto, as element of recovery, 50 A.LR.4th 13.
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Limitation on attorney's contingency
practice action.

fee in mal-

(1) In any malpractice action against a health care provider as defined in
§ 78-14-3, an attorney shall not collect a contingent fee for representing a

client seeking damages in connection with or arising out of personal injury or
wrongful death caused by the negligence of another which exceeds 33- 1/a% of
the amount recovered.
(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether the recovery is by settlement, arbitration, judgment, or whether appeal is involved.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-7.5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 67, § 1.
Effective Dates. - Section 2 of Laws 1985,

78-14-8.

ch. 67 provided: "This act takes effect on July
1, 1985."

Notice of intent to commence

action.

No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or
successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action.
Such notice shall include a general statement of the nature of the claim, the
persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the
manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the
summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt
requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the
date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action against a health care provider. If the notice is
served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time
period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health
care provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of notice.
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action,
and shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This
section shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims
against a health care provider.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 8; 1979, ch. 128,

§ 2. -

Cross-References. - Service of summons
and complaint, U .R.C.P. 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Action not timely
Effect of improper
Notice.
Retroactive effect
Tolling of statute

filed.
notice.
of 1979 amendment.
of limitations.
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Constitutionality.
The 1979 amendment of this section did not
violate constitutional requirement that acts
embrace no more than one subject; since title of
a bill need not describe each and every change
contained in the bill and the title of an act
amending a previous act is sufficient if it simply specifies the section to be amended.
McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center,
603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979).
The 1979 amendment of this section is not
unconstitutional as being a special law; the
amendment clearly operates uniformly upon a
class of persons consisting of all those having a
cause of action arising prior to the effective
date of the Health Care Malpractice Act (April
1, 1976) whether they have been filed or not.
McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center,
603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979).
This section does not constitute unconstitutional special legislation. Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980).
This section does not violate Utah Const.,
Art. I, Sec. 24 or Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26.
Allen v. lntermountain Health Care, Inc., 635
P.2d 30 (Utah 1981).
Action not timely filed.
Where plaintiff experienced complications
from breast surgery necessitating a second operation on November 2, 1976, and then filed a
notice of intent under this section on August
17, 1978, but did not file the action until J anuary 18, 1979, the action was properly dismissed
since the action had to be filed within 120 days
of the filing of the notice of intent (December
15, 1978). Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609
P.2d 934 (Utah 1980).

78-14-9

Effect of improper notice.
The notice provisions of this section were not
complied with where plaintiffs husband,
rather than plaintiff herself, filed the notice;
however, such failure to comply was not an adjudication on the merits, but merely a procedural defect that did not relate to the merits of
the basic action, and plaintiff was entitled to
serve a proper notice and file another comof
plaint pursuant to the requirements
§ 78-12-40. Yates v. Vernal Family Health
Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980).
Notice.
Filing of the complaint did not satisfy the
notice requirement as this section required notice be given ninety days before filing. Vealey
v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978).
Retroactive effect of 1979 amendment.
The 1979 amendment of this section was retroactive; however, the notice of intent to sue
provision is not applicable to causes of action
arising before enactment of the Malpractice
Act (April 1, 1976) and does not determine
when an action is "commenced." Foil v.
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979); McGuire
v. University of Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d
786 (Utah 1979).
Tolling of statute of limitations.
The 90-day period following the giving of notice under this section is not a statutory prohibition under§ 78-12-41 so as to toll the statute
of limitations during the 90-day period since
the specific provision of this section controls
the general provision of§ 78-12-41. Millett v.
Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians,
Surgeons, and Other Healers § 315.
C.J.S. - 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons
§ 59.

78-14-9.

Key Numbers. - Physicians and Surgeons

e=o 18(2).

Professional liability insurance coverage for providers - Insurance commissioner may require
joint underwriting authority.

If the commissioner finds after a hearing that in any part of this state any
professional liability insurance coverage for health care providers is not readily available in the voluntary market, and that the public interest requires, he
may by regulation promulgate and implement plans to pro.vide insurance
coverage through all insurers issuing professional liability policies and individual and group accident and sickness policies providing medical, surgical or
hospital expense coverage on either a prepaid or an expense incurred basis,
including personal injury protection and medical expense coverage issued
incidental to liability insurance policies.
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History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 9.
Cross-References. - Governmental enti-

ties

may

purchase

§§ 63-30-28 to .63-30-34.

liability

insurance,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -

§ 17 et seq.

43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance

C.J.S. - 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64.
A.L.R. - Health provider's agreement as to

78-14-9.5.

Periodic payment
practice actions.

patient's copayment
professional service
practice under state
Key Numbers. -

liability after award by
insurer as unfair trade
law, 49 A.L.R.4th 1240.
Insurance e=> 11.1.

of future damages

(1) As used in this section:

in mal-

(a) "Future damages" means a judgment creditor's damages for future
medical treatment, care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily
function, or future pain and suffering.
(b) "Periodic payments" means the payment of money or delivery of
other property to the judgment creditor at such intervals as ordered by
the court.
(2) In any malpractice action against a health care provider, as defined in
Subsection 78-14-3(29), the court shall, at the request of any party, order that
future damages which equal or exceed $100,000, less amounts payable for
attorney's fees and other costs which are due at the time of judgment, shall be
paid by periodic payments rather than by a lump sum payment.
(3) In rendering a judgment which orders the payment of future damages
by periodic payments, the court shall order periodic payments to provide a fair
correlation between the sustaining oflosses and the payment of damages. Lost
future earnings shall be paid over the judgment creditor's work life expectancy. The court shall also order, when appropriate, that periodic payments
increase at a fixed rate, equal to the rate of inflation which the finder of fact
used to determine the amount of future damages, or as measured by the most
recent Consumer Price Index applicable to Utah for all goods and services.
The present cash value of all periodic payments shall equal the fact finder's
award of future damages, less any amount paid for attorney's fees and costs.
The present cash value of periodic payments shall be determined by
discounting the total amount of periodic payments projected over the judgment creditor's life expectancy, by the rate of interest which the finder of fact
used to reduce the amount of future damages to present value, or the rate of
interest available at the time of trial on one year U.S. Government Treasury
Bills. Before periodic payments of future damages may be ordered, the court
shall require a judgment debtor to post security which assures full payment of
those damages. Security for payment of a judgment of periodic payments may
be in one or more of the following forms: •
(a) a bond executed by a qualified insurer;
(b) an annuity contract executed by a qualified insurer;
(c) evidence of applicable and collectable liability insurance with one or
more qualified insurers;
(d) an agreement by one or more qualified insurers to guarantee payment of the judgment; or
(e) any other form of security approved by the court.
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Security which complies with this section may also serve as a supersedeas
bond, where one is required.
(4) A judgment which orders payment of future damages by periodic payments shall specify the recipient or recipients of the payments, the dollar
amount of the payments, the interval between payments, and the number of
payments or the period of time over which payments shall be made. Those
payments may only be modified in the event of the death of the judgment
creditor.
(5) If the court finds that the judgment debtor, or the assignee of this obligation to make periodic payments, has failed to make periodic payments as
ordered by the court, it shall, in addition to the required periodic payments,
order the judgment debtor or his assignee to pay the judgment creditor all
damages caused by the failure to make payments, including court costs and
attorney's fees.
(6) The obligation to make periodic payments for all future damages, other
than damages for loss of future earnings, shall cease upon the death of the
judgment creditor. Damages awarded for loss of future earnings shall not be
reduced or payments terminated by reason of the death of the judgment creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the judgment creditor owed a duty of
support, as provided by law, immediately prior to his death. In that case the
court which rendered the original judgment may, upon petition of any party in
interest, modify the judgment to award and apportion the unpaid future damages in accordance with this section.
(7) If security is posted in accordance with Subsection (3), and approved by
a final judgment entered under this section, the judgment shall be deemed to
be satisfied, and the judgment debtor on whose behalf the security is posted
shall be discharged.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-9.5, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 170, § 1.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1986, ch. 170, § 4
makes the section effective July 1, 1986.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Future disease or condition, or
anxiety relating thereto, as element of recovery, 50 A.L.R.4th 13.

78-14-10.

Actions
Act.

under

Utah Governmental

Immunity

The provisions of this act shall apply to malpractice actions against health
care providers which are brought under the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act in so far as they are applicable; provided, however, that this act shall in
no way affect the requirements for filing notices of claims, times for commencing actions and limitations on amounts recoverable under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 10.
Meaning of "this act". - The phrase "this
act", referred to in this section, means Laws
1976, Chapter 23, which enacted this chapter

and § 78-14-11 and amended §§ 31-3-1,
31-5-21, and 78-12-28.
Cross-References. - Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq.
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Act not retroactive

-

Exception.

The provisions of this act, with the exception of the provisions relating to
the limitation on the time for commencing an action, shall not apply to injuries, death or services rendered which occurred prior to the effective date of
this act.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 14.
Meaning of "this act". - The phrase "this
act", referred to in this section, means Laws
1976, Chapter 23, which enacted this chapter
and § 78-14-11 and amended §§ 31-3-1,
31-5-21, and 78-12-28.

"Effective date of this act". - The phrase
"effective date of this act", referred to in this
section, means the effective date of Laws 1976,
Chapter 23, which took effect on April 1, 1976.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -

§ 347 et seq.

78-14-12.

C.J.S. - 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 412 et seq.
Key Numbers. - Statutes
261 et seq.

73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes

=

Department of Business Regulation to provide
panel - Procedures established by department
- Procedures for requesting panel - Notice Statute of limitations tolled - Composition of
panel - Members to receive per diem and travel
expenses - Department authorized to set license
fees of health care providers to cover costs of
administering panel.

(1) The Department of Business Regulation shall provide a hearing panel
in alleged medical malpractice cases against health care providers as defined
in § 78-14-3 filed after July 1, 1985. The department shall establish procedures for prelitigation consideration of personal injury and wrongful death
claims for damages arising out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide
health care. The proceedings are informal and nonbinding, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation. Proceedings conducted
under authority of this section are confidential, privileged, and immune from
civil process.
(2) The party initiating a medical malpractice action shall file a request for
prelitigation panel review with the Department of Business Regulation
within 60 days after the filing of a statutory notice of intent to commence
action under§ 78-14-8. The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent
to commence action. The request shall be mailed to all health care providers
named in the notice and request.
(3) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this section
tolls the applicable statute of limitations until 60 days following the issuance
of an opinion by the prelitigation panel. The opinion shall be sent to all
parties by certified mail, return receipt requested.
(4) The department provides for and appoints an appropriate panel or
panels to accept and hear complaints of negligence and damages, made by or
on behalf of any patient who is an alleged victim of negligence. The panels are
composed of:
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(a) one member appointed from a list provided by the commissioners of
the Utah State Bar, who is a resident lawyer currently licensed to practice law in this state who shall serve as chairman of the panel;
(b) one member who is licensed under § 78-14-3, who is practicing in
the same specialty as the proposed defendant, appointed from a list provided by the professional association representing the same area of practice as the health care provider; or in claims against only hospitals or
their employees, one member who is an individual currently serving in
hospital administration and appointed from a list submitted by the Utah
Hospital Association; and
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital employee, or
other health care provider, and who is a responsible citizen of the state,
selected and appointed by a unanimous decision of the members comprising the panel.
(5) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that
he or she is without bias or conflict of interest with respect to any matter
under consideration.
(6) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem compensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established by
rules of the Department of Business Regulation.
(7) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health
care providers, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the
Department of Business Regulation is authorized to set license fees of health
care providers within the limits established by law equal to their proportionate costs of administering prelitigation panels. None of the costs of administering the prelitigation panel shall be borne by the claimant, except as provided under § 78-14-16.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-12, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 238, § 1; 1986, ch. 170, § 2; 1987,
ch. 92, § 159.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment, effective July 1, 1986, substituted
"until" for "for a period of" preceding "60 days"
in the first sentence of Subsection (3).

78-14-13.

The 1987 amendment, in Subsection (7),
substituted "Division of Occupational Professional Licensing" for "Division of Registration."
Effective Dates. - Section 6 of Laws 1985,
ch. 238 provided: "This act takes effect on July
1, 1985."

Proceedings - Authority of panel parties to proceedings.

Rights of

(1) No record of the proceedings is required and all evidence, documents,
and exhibits are returned to the parties or witnesses who provided the evidence, documents, and exhibits at the end of the proceedings. The hearing
panel has the authority to issue subpoenas and to administer oaths, and any
expenses incurred by the panel in this regard are paid by the requesting
party, including, but not limited to, witness fees and mileage. The proceedings
are informal and formal rules of evidence are not applicable. There is no
discovery or perpetuation of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special
order of the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating extraordinary
circumstances.
(2) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with counsel, and participate
in the proceedings, except upon special order of the panel and unanimous
agreement of the parties. The proceedings are confidential and closed to the
337

78-14-14

JUDICIAL CODE

public. No party shall have the right to cross-examine, rebut, or demand that
customary formalities of civil trials and court proceedings be followed. The
panel may, however, request special or supplemental participation of some or
all parties in particular respects. Communications between the panel and the
parties, except the testimony of the parties on the merits of the dispute, are
disclosed to all other parties.
(3) The Department of Business Regulation shall appoint a panel to consider the claim and set the matter for panel review as soon as practicable after
receipt of a request.
(4) Parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings before a panel.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-13, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 238, § 2; 1986, ch. 170, § 3.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment, effective July 1, 1986, substituted "as

soon as practicable after" for "immediately
upon" in Subsection (3) and deleted the former
second and third sentences of that subsection.

78-14-:14. Decision and recommendations
judicial or other review.

of panel -

No

The panel shall render its opinion in writing not later than 30 days after the
end of the proceedings. The panel shall determine on the basis of the evidence
whether each claim against each health care provider has merit or has no
merit and, if meritorious, whether the conduct complained ofresulted in harm
to the claimant
There is no judicial or other review or appeal of the panel's decision or
recommendations.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-14, enacted
1985, ch. 238, § 3.

78-14-15.

by L.

Evidence of proceedings not admissible in subsequent action - Panelist may not be compelled
to testify - Immunity of panelist from civil liability.

Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical review panel and its
results, opinions, findings, and determinations are not admissible as evidence
in an action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of competent
jurisdiction. No panelist may be compelled to testify in a civil action subsequently filed with regard to the subject matter of the panel's review. A panelist has immunity from civil liability arising from participation as a panelist
and for all communications, findings, opinions, and conclusions made in the
course and scope of duties prescribed by this section.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-15, enacted
1985, ch. 238, § 4.

by L.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Liability of hospital or sanitarium
for negligence of physician or surgeon, 51
A.L.R.4th 235.

78-14-16. Proceedings considered a binding arbitration
hearing upon written agreement of parties Compensation to members of panel.
Upon written agreement by all parties, the proceeding may be considered a
binding arbitration hearing and proceed under Chapter 31a, Title 78, except
for the selection of the panel, which is done as set forth in Subsection
78-14-12(4). If the proceeding, is considered an arbitration proceeding, the
parties are equally responsible for compensation to the members of the panel
for services rendered.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-16, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 238, § 5.

CHAPTER 15
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT
Section
78-15-1. Short title of act.
78-15-2. Legislative findings and declarations - Purpose of chapter.
78-15-3. Statute of limitations - Application.
78-15-4. Prayer for damages.
78-15-5. Alteration or modification of product

Section

after sale as substantial contributing cause - Manufacturer or seller not liable.
78-15-6. Defect or defective condition making
product unreasonably dangerous - Rebuttable presumption.

78-15-1. Short title of act.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Product Liability
Act."
History: C. 1953, 78-15-1, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 149, § 1.
Meaning of "this act". - The phrase "this

act", referred to in this section, means Laws
1977, Chapter 149, which enacted this chapter.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
The Utah Product Liability Act is unconsti-

tutional. Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - The Utah Product
Liability Limitation of Action: An Unfair Resolution of Competing Concerns, 1979 Utah L.
Rev. 149.
Strict Products Liability in Utah Following

Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 1980
Utah L. Rev. 577.
Some Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons
in Products Liability Cases, 1981 Utah L. Rev.
3.
•
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